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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred by Striking Mr. Lopez's Pro Se Motion Instead of 
Addressing His Requests for New Counselor to Proceed Pro Se and Additional 
Time to Respond to the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Approximately twenty-three days after the district court issued a notice of intent to 
dismiss that provided Mr. Lopez twenty days to respond, the district court received a pro se 
document from Mr. Lopez titled "Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss Application for Post-Conviction Relief." CR (40751) 29-31, 35-42, 44-48. In 
a supporting affidavit, Mr. Lopez explained that no attorney had communicated with him 
regarding the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, that he would request substitute counsel 
and that equitable concerns dictated that he be allowed an opportunity to respond to the district 
court's notice. Id. at p. 44-45. In the motion, Mr. Lopez asked for additional time to respond to 
the notice of intent to dismiss "pro se" as a result of "court appointed counsel's shortcomings." 
Id. at p. 47-50. Although the district court found that "appointed counsel had taken no action to 
address the Court's Notice ofIntent to Dismiss," it nonetheless simultaneously ordered the pro se 
motion stricken because Mr. Lopez was represented by counsel and dismissed the petition 
because thirty-one days had elapsed since the district court issued its notice of intent to dismiss. 
Id. at p. 50. 
Pro se pleadings filed while a party is represented, which include requests to discharge 
counselor complaints directed towards counsel's performance, are a critical exception to the 
general rule allowing courts to treat such pro se pleadings as a nullity. See In re Barnett, 73 P.3d 
1106, 1110 (Cal. 2003); Whiting v. State, 929 So.2d 673, 674-75 (Fla. App. 2006); People v. 
Milton, 820 N.E.2d 1074, 1081 (Ill. App. 2004); State v. Graddick, 548 S.E.2d 210, 211 (S.C. 
2001).1 Mr. Lopez's request for additional time to respond to the district court's notice of intent 
to dismiss informed the district court that no attorney had communicated with him regarding the 
notice and that he wished to either respond pro se or to seek appointment of substitute counsel. 
Because the motion and affidavit were directed towards counsel's nonperformance - and that 
nonperformance was corroborated by the fact no attorney had appeared in the case or responded 
to the notice of intent to dismiss - the district court abused its discretion in striking Mr. Lopez's 
motion. 
In arguing to the contrary, the state notes that Mr. Lopez's motion requested additional 
time to respond to the district court's notice and then argues that requests for extension oftime 
do not fall within the exception to the court's ability to strike pro se pleadings filed while a party 
is represented. The state further contends that Mr. Lopez was represented by an attorney because 
the district court had issued an order appointing counsel even if no attorney had actually appeared 
in the case. Finally, the state suggests that the exception regarding pro se pleadings directed at 
counsel's performance should not apply at all because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
does not guarantee the effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings. 
Mr. Lopez's motion requested additional time to respond pro se because of counsel's non 
performance. Thus, the circumstances fall squarely within the exception to the rule allowing pro 
1 The state contends that I.R.C.P. II(a) allows the court to strike a pleading signed by the 
litigant when that litigant is represented. Respondent's Brief, p. 8-10. Even if the state is 
correct, Rule 1 1 (a) permits the court to strike the pleading only when "a pleading, motion or 
other paper is not signed ... promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader 
or movant." (emphasis added). Here, the district court struck Mr. Lopez's motion without 
providing an opportunity to cure any defect. Regardless of whether Rule 11 (a) supported the 
district court's action, it appears that the issue is appropriately considered as one of inherent 
discretion as set forth in the multiple extra-jurisdictional opinions cited by both parties. 
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se pleadings to be stricken when a party is represented. Further, although the district court 
ordered the appointment of counsel, no attorney had entered an appearance, filed any documents 
or communicated with Mr. Lopez. Refusing to consider Mr. Lopez's complaint regarding 
counsel's lack of performance and then dismissing the action based on that same non 
performance deprived Mr. Lopez of his statutory right to counsel and his due process right to a 
meaningful opportunity to present his post-conviction claims. Accordingly, the district court 
abused it discretion in striking Mr. Lopez's motion and the case must be remanded for 
appointment of counsel and an opportunity to respond to the notice of intent to dismiss. 
1. Mr. Lopez's motion and affidavit are directed towards counsel's non 
performance and fall within the exception requiring courts to consider pro se 
pleadings filed by represented litigants 
Mr. Lopez informed the district court that no attorney had communicated with him about 
or responded to the court's notice of intent to dismiss. He thus requested additional time to 
respond "pro se" and indicated he would request substitute counsel. According to the state, Mr. 
Lopez asked for "additional time to file a pro se response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss 
while still represented by counsel" and because "the motion was a request for additional time, not 
a request to discharge counsel ... the district court acted within its discretion in declining to 
consider it." Respondent's Brief, p. 12-13 (emphasis in original). 
The state's conclusion that Mr. Lopez asked for additional time to respond pro se while 
still represented, as opposed to representing himself in the action, appears to be predicated on the 
absence of explicit language asking the court to "discharge" counsel. Such a conclusion cannot 
be drawn from Mr. Lopez's motion and affidavit. To the contrary, Mr. Lopez asked for time to 
respond pro se and to seek substitute counsel, suggesting he wished to be represented by 
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competent counsel. Particularly in light of Mr. Lopez's status as an inmate without legal 
training, the absence of an explicit request to "discharge" counsel cannot be used to conclude that 
he must have desired hybrid representation rather than to proceed on his own or to have another 
attorney appointed. 
On the other hand, the motion and affidavit do clearly indicate that Mr. Lopez had not 
heard from his attorney regarding the district court's notice and that he wished to have an 
opportunity to respond. Even if not an explicit request to proceed pro se, the motion and 
affidavit clearly were directed at counsel's performance. Indeed, because no attorney had 
addressed the deadline to respond to the notice, Mr. Lopez reasonably perceived the first order of 
business as addressing the deadline and the second order of business as seeking substitute 
counsel. 
The reasoning underlying the exception discussed in the various cases cited in Mr. 
Lopez's Opening Brief applies fully in these circumstances. Mr. Lopez's motion and affidavit 
based his request for additional time on counsel's ineffective (or non existence) assistance. 
Accordingly, the district court was obligated to address Mr. Lopez's request even though counsel 
had been appointed. 
2. The district court granted Mr. Lopez's motion for appointment of counsel 
but no attorney had appeared in the case 
As Mr. Lopez noted in his Opening Brief, no attorney had filed a notice of appearance or 
any other document in the case at the time the action was summarily dismissed. While the 
certificate of service on the district court's orders reflects that Mark Mimura (the Canyon County 
Public Defender) had been appointed, the record reveals that Mimura's office represented Mr. 
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Lopez in the initial post-conviction proceedings. Compare CR (37206) p. 120 (Mimura Law) 
with CR (40751) p. 34 (Mimura Law). Thus, Mimura's office could not represent Mr. Lopez on 
his claim that he was entitled to proceed with a successive petition due to ineffective assistance 
of counsel in those initial proceedings. In response, the state argues that Mr. Lopez is 
challenging the district court's factual finding that he was represented. Respondent's Brief, p. 
13-14. The state further asserts that the absence of any documents being filed on Mr. Lopez's 
behalf does not establish that he was unrepresented and that Mr. Lopez's contrary assertions are 
bare speculation. 
The district court's order granting Mr. Lopez's request for counsel provides that the 
"Canyon County Public Defenders Office, or, if necessary, conflict counsel" was appointed to 
represent Mr. Lopez. R. 33. The register of actions reflects that no attorney filed an appearance 
or any other documents before the action was dismissed. R. 1. As noted, it would have been 
necessary to assign conflict counsel as provided for in the district court's order. Thus, while Mr. 
Lopez does not challenge the district court's finding that an order appointing counsel had been 
issued, the record also establishes that no attorney had appeared in the case or taken any action 
with respect to the notice of intent to dismiss. While Mr. Lopez postulated that no attorney had 
yet entered an appearance given the proximity of the district court's order appointing counsel and 
its notice ofintent to dismiss,2 it is also possible that the order appointing counsel was never 
2 Counsel notes that in a recent Canyon County successive post-conviction action, thirty-
one days elapsed between the district court's initial order appointing counsel and the order 
naming the conflict attorney assigned to represent the petitioner in the case. See Register of 
Actions, Jimenez v. State, Canyon County Case No. CV-2013-0004753-C. Here, thirty-seven 
days elapsed between the order appointing counsel and the order summarily dismissing the 
action. Thus, although undersigned counsel has speculated as to the precise reason no attorney 
appeared on Mr. Lopez's behalf before his petition was dismissed, that speculation is consistent 
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received by the public defender's office or that the office simply failed to comply with the order. 
Whatever the reason, no attorney had appeared on Mr. Lopez's behalf when the action was 
dismissed. 
In the end, it is unnecessary to determine whether a party is truly represented when the 
court has ordered that counsel be appointed but no attorney has appeared in the case. The district 
court issued a notice of intent to dismiss within days of granting Mr. Lopez's request for counsel, 
refused to consider Mr. Lopez's pleas to provide additional time since no attorney had contacted 
him regarding the notice and then dismissed the action notwithstanding Mr. Lopez's 
representations and the absence of any attorney's appearance on Mr. Lopez's behalf. Because the 
district court's decisions were not reached through an exercise of reason and were profoundly 
unfair, it abused its discretion in dismissing Mr. Lopez's successive petition without addressing 
his request for additional time. 
3. The interest of justice and due process require considering pro se pleadings 
in circumstances such as those at bar 
The Florida appellate court described the difficulty in refusing to consider pro se requests 
regarding counsel's performance as follows: 
In the first place, if the claim is that the appointed lawyer is not doing the lawyer's 
assigned job, one might wonder how that failure would ever come to light and be 
appropriately remedied if the person who is suffering from this inadequacy is not 
permitted to do so. Simply ignoring a pretrial assertion of ineffectiveness of 
counsel means that the claim is left to be taken up in post conviction relief 
proceedings. 
Graves v. State, 642 So.2d 142, 144 (Fla. App. 1994). According to the state, "Graves is 
inapposite ... because in that case the defendant actually filed a pro se motion to discharge his 
with the practice in Canyon County. 
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appointed attorney on the basis that the attorney had been" noncommunicative and because the 
Graves defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel whereas Mr. Lopez does not. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 14-15. Initially, as explained above, that Mr. Lopez asked for time to 
respond to the district court's notice "pro se" because no attorney had either contacted him or 
responded to the notice, rather than explicitly indicate he wished to "discharge" counsel, is a 
distinction without a difference. 
Moreover, while Mr. Lopez does not have a Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, he does have a due process right to a 
meaningful opportunity to present his post-conviction claims. See Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 
186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008), citing Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 
P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful 
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process"); see also 
Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381,385,924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1996); Mellinger v. State, 
113 Idaho 31, 35, 740 P.2d 73, 77 (Ct. App. 1987) (Burnett, J., concurring). The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
The right to a meaningful opportunity to present post-conviction claims is protected by a 
petitioner's ability to litigate a successive petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908 when ineffective 
assistance of counsel results in those claims being inadequately presented. The right is also 
protected by the statutory right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings and the requirement 
that a court appoint counsel under that statute when the litigant provides the possibility of a valid 
claim. Thus, similar to the reasoning of the Graves Court, "simply ignoring a [post-conviction] 
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assertion of ineffectiveness of counsel means that the claim is left to be taken up in [successive] 
post conviction relief proceedings." Graves, 642 So.2d at 144. The reasoning of the Graves and 
other opinions apply equally where the non performing attorney has been appointed to represent a 
former criminal defendant in a post-conviction proceedings. 
B. The District Court's Error in Striking the Motion Affected His Substantial Rights 
and Requires Remand for Appointment of Counsel and an Opportunity to Respond 
to the District Court's Notice 
The record establishes that Mr. Lopez could possibly demonstrate sufficient reason for 
inadequately presenting his ineffective assistance of counsel's claims during initial post-
conviction relief proceedings and, thus, that he could litigate those claims in successive 
proceedings. Accordingly, the district court's error in simultaneously striking his pro se motion 
and dismissing the case affected his substantial rights and the case must be remanded for 
appointment of counsel and an opportunity to respond to the district court's notice of intent to 
dismiss. 
According to the state, Mr. Lopez has not demonstrated that he was entitled to a 
continuance and, thus, the district court's abuse of discretion in striking Mr. Lopez's motion did 
not violate his substantial rights. Respondent's Brief, p. 16-17. However, Mr. Lopez's 
arguments that the district court abused its discretion by striking the motion also establish that it 
would be an abuse of discretion to fail to grant additional time to respond to the notice. 
Because "the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is 'the exclusive means for 
challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence' other than by direct appeal," the interest of 
justice can require an exception to the rule that litigants are generally bound by their attorneys' 
actions in civil proceedings. See Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737, 228 P.3d 998, 1004 (2010). 
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No attorney communicated with Mr. Lopez regarding the notice of intent to dismiss, filed an 
appearance or responded in any fashion to the notice. Mr. Lopez thus requested additional time 
to respond. To refuse to grant additional time in those circumstances would not only deprive Mr. 
Lopez of a meaningful opportunity to present his claims, but also be unreasonable and an abuse 
of discretion. 
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Lopez explained how he was harmed by the district court's 
decision to simultaneously strike his motion and dismiss the case because he presented the 
possibility of valid claims and was thus entitled to the assistance of counsel. In response to these 
arguments, the state simply notes they were not raised below. Respondent's Brief, p. 17. 
However, arguments illustrating that the record supports valid claims and that representation is 
thus required are, by their nature, not presented in the district court. Because the record 
establishes the possibility of valid claims, Mr. Lopez was harmed by the district court's decision 
to strike his motion and dismiss the case without an opportunity to respond to the notice of intent 
to dismiss. The case should be remanded for appointment of counsel and an opportunity to 
respond. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in his Opening Brief, Mr. Lopez respectfully asks 
this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing his post-conviction claims and to 
remand this case for appointment of counsel and an opportunity to respond to the district court's 
notice of intent to dismiss. 
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Respectfully submitted this _-'-- day of January 2014. 
NEV~,I~: JAMIN, McKA Y & BARTLETT LLP 
//~. 
R yn Fyffe 
Attorney for Ernesto Garza Lopez 
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